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After the coerced opening of Japan through American gunboats in 1853,1 several unequal 
treaties between the Tokugawa Regime, the United States, and some European powers, 
respectively, were negotiated in the 1850s.2 In order to revise these treaties some years 
later, after the Meiji Revolution in 1868 and in the course of efforts to establish a nation 
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and enlightenment”3 policies. They were pushed by the elites, who feared becoming 
colonised by ‘Western’ powers. The term bunmei kaika (civilisation and enlightenment), 
a key phrase of Early Meiji Japan and the slogan of the implemented modernisation 
programs, was a translation of ‘Western’ concepts like ‘civilisation’ and ‘enlightenment’ 
and was created in the years of the Meiji Revolution. It also included connotations of 
“subduing land” and “to become like the West”.4 The translation and adaption of these 
concepts were assigned with the goal of reaching ‘Western civilisation’.5 In this sense, Nishi 
Amane, a member of the famous Meiji-Six-Society, a group of intellectuals regularly 
discussing issues of ‘modernisation’, had already announced in 1874 the need to “civilise 
common people” and uplift them to the level of the civilisation of ‘Western’ nations.6 
With the transfer of the idea of enlightenment, its ambiguity was also taken over,7 a 
matter which will be discussed later in detail. The term mission civilisatrice, used by the 
French especially in the second half of the 19th century as a doctrine in their colonies, as 
well as the adapted English phrase, civilising mission,8 were later also used by Japanese 
colonial politicians.9
Part of the modernisation policies was the objective of the Japanese government to be-
come an empire just like the ‘Western’ ones. This goal was first achieved in 1895 with 
the annexation of Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese war. Thereby, the Japanese politicians 
saw themselves faced with the dilemma that they wished to create an Asiatic form of co-
lonial rule better than the ‘despotic’ ‘Western’ one, but at the same time, could not help 
implementing a colonial rule that was based upon ‘Western’ models. Japanese politicians 
were caught in the dilemma between the model of Western colonialism and the counter 
model of a benevolent Asian colonialism, one which had still to be invented. In this 
paradoxical situation not only were notions of the ‘West’ ambivalent, but also within this 
dilemma, intertwinement with China gained importance. China had been the epitome 
of ‘civilisation’ for Japan for centuries, but the colonial enterprises of Japan were accom-
panied by a completely new connotation of a ‘backward’ and ‘barbarous’ China. These 
notions, however, stood in contrast to the idea of creating an Asian counter model to 
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‘civilisation’ in Japan itself. This situation can be seen as a double bind10 situation because 
of its insurmountable dilemma and intertwinement on several levels. It is reflected in a 
kind of double civilising mission: a ‘self civilisation’ in Japan and a mission civilisatrice 
in Taiwan.
Using the term double bind as an analytic framework, I will investigate some new aspects 
of this historical constellation, paying special attention to the penal reforms in Japan 
and Taiwan within the two civilising missions. Doing so, I will focus on three neglected 
aspects in historiography. First, I am concerned with the consequences that Japan’s en-
counter with the ‘West’ had on the history of the country after its opening in the 1850s, 
but not in the sense of a binary opposition between Japan and the ‘West’ as it is still often 
described. Conventional scholarship in the field of colonial historiography tends to con-
struct the narrative of a modern Japanese nation state overcoming the moment of crisis 
brought by ‘Western’ impact and finally ‘caught up’ with these ‘Western’ countries.11 But 
the ongoing process of transferring knowledge as well as actors is still neglected. Second, 
I address the claim of postcolonial studies to overcome the dichotomy of metropole 
against colony,12 a dichotomy which has been considered in recent colonial historiogra-
phy on Japan around the turn of the 20th century.13 The entanglement of the reforms in 
the centre and the periphery of Japan’s civilising missions will be part of my article, but I 
will argue that the relation between metropole and colony has sometimes been overem-
phasised by recent postcolonial studies. Especially in the case of Japanese colonisation, it 
is crucial to place this relation within a wider global interplay of power relations which 
can by no means be reduced to only the interaction between metropole and colony or 
to simply the connection to the ‘West’. This leads to the third aspect: it is not enough 
to write an entangled history of modern Japan or Japanese colonialism describing the 
historical situation as a tripartite constellation of Japan, its colonies and the ‘West’. In 
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of an Asian counter model cannot be explained as the backflow from Asian colonies to 
the Japanese metropole coming up against ‘Western’ influence, but only within the con-
text of the alternative of a Chinese notion of civilisation. Therefore, schematised, it could 
be said that in the historical constellation four points are important and in constant, 
dynamic interaction. One is the mainland of Japan, another is Taiwan (or more generally 
the Japanese colonies), a third the ‘Western’ imperial powers and the last, China. Japan 
forms my point of view within the constellation – a double bind situation, which results 
in a triple bind connection to the three other points. The interactions within the network 
are not equilateral or balanced, but constantly moving and under incessant tension and 
pressure. Knowledge and practices were transferred between the Japanese metropole, 
Japanese colonies, the ‘West’, and also China. As the shape of the intertwinement within 
these points and their complex asymmetric power relation changed, the characteristics of 
the self civilisation in Japan and civilising mission in Taiwan changed with them. I would 
argue that it is also a question of position: Changing the viewpoint from Japan to the 
‘West’, for example, would give us a very different perspective. In this article however the 
main point of view will be from Japan, focusing especially on the interactions between 
Japan and its colony, Taiwan.
First, I will focus on the reforms of the penal system in Early Meiji Japan within the 
framework of the modernisation policies that were used for self civilisation. I will shed 
light on the phenomenon that even if the reform of legal codes and also the practical 
execution of punishments were based on Chinese ones, in the context of self civilisation, 
simultaneous efforts to civilise ‘the other’ in Taiwan had already emerged in the Early 
Meiji period (1868–1880). Second, I will discuss the reintroduction of flogging in Tai-
wan in 1904, which was seen as a ‘civilising punishment’ for Taiwanese and Chinese by 
the Japanese Colonial Government. I will describe, on the one hand, the contradictions 
in the disputes and discourse on the implementation of this form of punishment with its 
ideal of a civilising mission; and on the other hand, I will examine the often even more 
outstanding ambiguity emerging between practices and rhetorics. The last chapter analy-
ses the role of the newly built ‘modern’ prison in Taipei (Taihoku) and its function as 
signifier of the double bind structure, in which Japan’s civilising mission was imbedded.
1.  Reforms of the Penal System in Meiji-Japan: Self Civilisation after Chinese 
and British Colonial Models
The unequal treaties between the Tokugawa Regime and the United States, and some 
European powers, respectively, allowed permanent enclaves of foreign people, especially 
in Yokohama close to Tokyo. ‘Western’ diplomatic representatives were convinced that 
the Japanese penal system was too cruel to subject their citizens to it. Therefore ‘Western-
ers’ in Japan had the right of extraterritoriality.14 The Japanese intellectual and political 
4	 M.	R.	Auslin,	Negotiating	with	Imperialism	(footnote	2),	pp.	40-4	and	p.	7.
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elite realized quite soon after the opening that the penal practice of a country was one 
of the markers of the boundaries between, on the one hand, the ‘civilised West’, and on 
the other hand, the colonial space, which was associated with ‘backwardness’ and ‘bar-
barism’ in the eyes of most of the American or European politicians and intellectuals.15 
Therefore, the new Meiji government pushed forward with its ‘modernizing’ programs,16 
especially those which concerned legal codes: Within a month after the “Restoration of 
Imperial Rule” in 1868 the new rulers had already compiled provisional penal regula-
tions, the so-called kari keiritsu.17 They announced the strict limitation of crucifixion 
and the complete abolishment of burning alive within the next year.18 Over the last cen-
tury there had already been domestic debate and criticism of the old penal system as well 
as studies of Chinese legal codes as alternatives to the traditional legislation in each do-
main. Therefore, scholars trained in Chinese law, most of them coming originally from 
southern domains where adapted Chinese codes had already been used, were integrated 
into the first Office of Criminal Law under the Ministry of Punishments (gyōbusho). 
Their main task was to compile the first provisional code. Soon after these measures, the 
Meiji government’s first national criminal code was completed in early 1871.19 Usually it 
is argued in historiography that the Meiji government revised its legal codes with respect 
to the Chinese ones, because they did not yet know ‘Western’ law.20 Even if ‘Western’ 
legal codes had not been well known in the 1860s, it has to be taken into account that 
the Early Meiji leaders were deeply influenced by British colonial legal practices – as we 
will see later – in the revision of the prison system which occurred in 1871.21
For the revision of these unequal treaties, a group which was to travel to the United 
States and Europe was formed. The so-called Iwakura Mission included the most power-
ful leaders of the new regime, and one of its main objectives was to convince the ‘West-
ern’ powers to open treaty negotiations.22 In conjunction with this goal the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs distributed copies of the “Outline of the New Code” to representatives of 
the treaty powers in early 1871. The leaders hoped that providing proof that significant 
legal reforms had already been established would convince the foreign nations to give 
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on their journey that the treaty powers judged the Chinese penal code, on which Japan’s 
provisional code was based, as the epitome of ‘Oriental despotism’. Ironically the right 
of extraterritoriality had been introduced to Asia in order to protect British citizens from 
Chinese laws. Based on racial arguments the ‘West’ judged the Chinese laws, which were 
used in the new code, as uncivilised.23 This judgement gave the Japanese reforms another 
dimension. The Meiji Regime realized that in order to revise the treaties they would have 
to make additional efforts to reform the penal codes beyond basing them on Chinese 
laws. The reform also had to be positioned within a totally new framework of human 
categorization in the enlightenment and civilisation movement. And it was exactly this 
pattern of categorization which remained an insolvable problem for the early generation 
of intellectuals, enthusiastic maintainers of the modernisation and westernisation pro-
grammes. How these racial categories were directly linked to the penal reforms in order 
to elude the semicolonialized status of the country is shown in an essay by Tsuda Mam-
ichi in the Meirokuzasshi, named after the already mentioned Meiji-Six-Society. Tsuda 
demanded a reform of the criminal justice and penal systems. He had been studying 
Dutch legal codes even before the Restoration and had been in Holland to study dur-
ing the Tokugawa Regime. He was also a member of the new Office of Criminal Law.24 
Already in 1874 he had called for the abolishment of torture. After arguing that there 
was nothing more evil in the world than torture, he explained the different human races, 
grouping them along the Himalayan mountains. This rock mass symbolized the border 
between the ‘civilised’ and ‘barbarian’ races. He wrote: 
There is now no torture in countries of German race, but Mongolian races have not yet 
escaped torture in general. What a wonderful dividing barrier the Himalayas are! If you 
imagine that there are such happy people as the Germans and such unhappy people as 
the Mongolians among the world’s men!  25 
In another article he suggested the abolishment of torture as a means to revise the un-
equal treaties.26 The direct connection to the treaties most likely had a significant impact 
on the policies of the Meiji government. Soon afterwards torture was limited.27 A new 
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Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie, and in fact, the validity of the codes of shinritsu 
kōryō, influenced extensively by Chinese legal tradition, continued to stay in force.28
Another example of the extent to which the dichotomies of ‘civilised’ and ‘barbarous’ in 
conjunction with the framework of ‘race’ were internalized by the Japanese officials is 
the study trip led by Ohara Shigeya (also a member of the Office of Criminal Law) to 
the British colonial prisons in Hong Kong and Singapore in 1871.29 Seeing themselves 
as not on the side of the “happy races”, to cite Tsuda again, the Japanese officials felt 
– consciously or not – that it would be appropriate to use the British colonial prisons 
as a model for the punishment of the Japanese, a measure in which they were actually 
‘colonising themselves’. The idea that a colonial unconsciousness underlay Japanese mo-
dernity was formulated by Komori Yichi in his studies on Japanese modern history. He 
has described the phenomenon as ‘self colonisation’, in the sense that the elite forced a 
civilisation program on the Japanese subjects.30 Ohara, who had been imprisoned for 
political reasons during the Tokugawa Regime, advocated the abolition of flogging and 
envisioned ‘benevolent rule’ in Japan’s new prisons. Researchers have interpreted his po-
sition as a manifestation of his sympathy with the prisoners resulting from his own 
experience. However, according to Umemori Naoyuki’s study on prison reforms in Meiji 
Japan, Ohara’s position should be problematised in the colonial context. He claims that 
Ohara could identify himself neither with the ruler nor the ruled and therefore exempli-
fies the “very figure of the divided subject”. Referring to Homi Bhabha, Umemori de-
scribes this phenomenon as “epistemic violence” resulting from a doubleness in colonial 
enunciation which arises from the conflicting demands for stable identity and historical 
reform, both inherent features of the civilising mission.31
This uncertain position of the leading Japanese politicians during this process of ‘self col-
onisation’ can also be connected to Japan’s efforts to colonise other parts of Asia as early 
as the first decade after the Meiji Revolution. The official explanation for an 1874 ‘expe-
dition’ to Taiwan was the punishment of the ‘barbarous’ murder of a group of fishermen 
from the Ryūkyū Island, today’s Okinawa. The story told in the Japanese newspapers was 
that ‘civilised’ Japanese soldiers had come to Taiwan to bring civilization to ‘barbarians’: 
“This expedition to punish the barbarians is the first step to diffuse civilisation on this 
island”.32 These explicit words are accompanied by a woodcut print showing a Japanese 
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man with white skin and a short haircut. Just two years ago there had been a prohibi-
tion of long hair in Japan, part of the modernising efforts.33 Two ‘barbarians’ signified 
by dark brown skin and long hair are kneeling in front of the soldier. The adoption of 
this European scientific concept combined physical differences and race categorizations 
with the inner character of human beings and attributes like ‘civilised’ or ‘barbarous’. 
It was not only internalised after the Meiji revolution and implemented in Japan, but 
it was also applied to others. The inner ‘mission’ for civilisation was intertwined with 
Japan’s external ‘mission’ towards their neighbours as early as in 1874, an entanglement 
beginning even before the Sino-Japanese or Russo-Japanese war. These colonising efforts 
in Taiwan show the conjunction of modernizing efforts and imperial expansion already 
in Early Meiji Japan. These attempts to colonise Taiwan initially failed because of major 
pressure from the ‘Western’ imperial powers, but the goal was reached in 1895 after a 
victory in the Sino-Japanese war.
Simultaneous efforts to civilise ‘the other’ in Taiwan – at that time a part of China – were 
promoted as a part of self civilisation in Early Meiji, despite using Chinese law as a model 
for both the reform of legal codes and the practical execution of. This phenomenon al-
ludes to shifting notions of civilisation within Japanese politics and their dilemma in 
conceptualising either the ‘East’ or the ‘West’ as the embodiment of civilisation.
2.  Reintroducing Flogging in Taiwan: Struggling between ‘Civilised’ and 
‘Barbarous’ Punishment
Soon after the annexation of the island in 1895 the Japanese General Government abol-
ished the practice of flogging, part of the law under the Qing Empire, for its ‘barbarous’ 
nature. But the practice was reintroduced after just a few years: In January 1904 the Japa-
nese General Governor Kodama Gentarō proclaimed the so-called “Fines and Flogging 
Ordinance”, to which only “Chinese” and “Insulars” were subjected. To justify the meas-
ure, he stated the overcrowded prisons in Taiwan and the General Government’s shortage 
of funding for implementing a system of punishment for the Taiwanese people.34 Chief 
Procurator of the Taiwan Supreme Court Odate Koretaka, already having a draft law of 
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response to the argument of overcrowded prisons he stated that the number of prison-
ers had, on the contrary, drastically declined after the 1901 policy of “eradicating the 
bandits”.36 He explained that the Japanese government had abolished flogging because 
of its ‘barbaric’ nature just a few years ago, and that reintroducing it would, against the 
Emperor’s will, treat Taiwan as a “colony”, thus contradicting the policy of Taiwan as 
the “extension of the inner country”. With this statement he placed himself in the long 
lasting debate over if Taiwan should be treated as an “extension of the inner country”, 
an “outer country” or even a “colony”, and he confronted the current rule of difference 
promoted by the General Government with the ideas of assimilation politics.37
Even though Odate’s memorandum could not prevent the proclamation of the ordi-
nance, he did not remain the only critic. Only a day after its proclamation an article in 
the high-circulation newspaper, Yomiuri shinbun, in Japan entitled “The Degeneration 
of the Criminal Law: Taiwan’s Flogging Ordinance”38 argued against the promulgation, 
an argument remarkably similar to the ones of Odate. But there was another point made 
in the article: the term ‘degeneration’ not only means the fear of a degeneration of the 
Japanese criminal law, but was also concerned with the degeneration of the ‘barbarous’ 
Chinese and Taiwanese, because they would degenerate even more by being punished in 
a ‘barbarous’ way, and would therefore never manage to become a ‘civilised race’. One 
of Japan’s leading penologists, Ogawa Shigejirō, interpreted the attack on the “Flogging 
Ordinance” as making this same argument.39 Although they represent completely dif-
ferent opinions, both sides adhered to social Darwinist gradualist ideas. In Taiwan, Civil 
Governor Gotō Shinpei had promoted a continuous and persistent state of difference 
between the populations in Japan and Taiwan, but also within the Taiwanese popula-
tion since his assumption in 1898: this occurred due to the connection of physical and 
psychological attributes with so-called racial characteristics, which at the same time were 
linked with ascriptions such as ‘barbarous’ or ‘civilised’. Thereby, having a timely and 
straightforward axis along which to civilise individual races was central. The temporal 
backshift and positioning of different countries and cultures in a continuously progress-
ing line of development did not only shape the colonial policies in Taiwan, but was also a 
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tion of colonial knowledge.40 Gotō had the vision of a “Hundred-Year-Plan”41 within 
the “civilising mission”, a plan that would improve the Taiwanese population through a 
gradual evolution.42 This point matches the plea for the ‘civilisation’ of the ‘barbarous’ 
Taiwanese in “Degeneration of the Criminal Law”, which criticises his flogging poli-
tics. ‘Civilised’ and ‘barbarous’ remained pivotal in the controversy on the “Fines and 
Flogging Ordinance”.43 Suzuki Sōgen, the Chief Procurator of the Supreme Court of 
Taiwan, as well as Tejima Heijirō, the head of the law department of the colonial Gen-
eral Government, were in charge of the General Government and attacked the voices 
criticizing the implementation of the “Fines and Flogging Ordinance” Responding to 
Ogawa’s argument that barbarous punishment would provoke “barbarous behaviour”, 
Suzuki objected that the punishment would be very “modern” and “civilised” in the 
newly adapted form and pointed out the disciplining and educative function of it.44 As a 
proof of its civilising effects Suzuki also proposed that ‘Western’ powers might consider 
reintroducing flogging, not only in the colonies, but also in their metropoles and in do-
ing so realise its benefits. Benefits, he went on to say, the Japanese had always known in 
their tradition.45
Even if Suzuki is arguing with “tradition”, he is doing it within the framework of modern 
concepts of punishment and civilisation: The idea of disciplining was not a genuine Japa-
nese idea, but was rather, I argue, a modern one.46 His attempt to undermine the stable 
notion of the ‘civilised West’ against the ‘backwards East’ is at the same time a response 
to modernity, described by Harry Harootunian as the “consciousness that oscillated 
furiously between recognizing the peril of being overcome by modernity and the impos-
sible imperative of overcoming it”.47 This phenomenon, which Harootunian points out 
in the Taishō (1912–1926) and Shōwa (1926–1989) eras, can already be seen here. The 
concept of disciplining matched, on one hand, the idea of the “civilising mission” of the 
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The situation of militant violence in the first years of colonial rule had changed Taiwan to 
a disciplinary society, and if we draw on Michel Foucault,48 a society in which ‘Western’ 
science established itself more and more as a frame of reference. A striking example is 
Tejima Heijirō, who entitled one chapter of a pro-flogging article, “scientific evaluation”. 
To give his arguments more weight, he refers to European criminal law experts,49 just as 
Suzuki does.50 Tejima also describes parallels between the British colonial criminal codes 
and some of the articles of the “Fines and Flogging Ordinance”.51
This raises the question of whether the Japanese Colonial Government followed a Brit-
ish colonial model. Daniel Botsman argues in favour of the argument that they did, and 
draws upon the wording of a paragraph of the ordinance, reasoning that the Japanese 
did not beat on the back, as one was traditionally beaten in Japan or China, but on the 
buttocks.52 He assumes that beating on the buttocks was the usual practice in Britain’s 
colonies.53 The writings of Gotō Shinpei’s son-in-law and friend, Tsurumi Yūsuke, also 
support this thesis, emphasising that the inspiration for the implementation of flogging 
was Lord Cromer, the first British General Consul of Egypt.54 But contrary to this, the 
“History of the Japanese Colonial Police”, compiled between 1933 and 1944, states 
that reliable sources for the reconstruction of the reasons for the Flogging Ordinance 
are lacking.55 Umemori Naoyuki, who consulted additional sources in his research, also 
concludes that the connection to Cromer and to the motives for the introduction of flog-
ging are only partly reconstructable.56
Contrary to the common interpretation in historiography, I will show that the introduc-
tion of flogging in Taiwan did not rely on a direct transfer of knowledge or practices 
from the British colony in Egypt. In this regard, consulting sources of the “Commission 
for the Investigation of Laws and Customs” will bring new results. As we will see, within 
these investigations the idea of a civilising mission was crucial as well.
The aim of this commission, established in 1901, was namely one of a political nature.57 
Okamatsu Santarō, jurist and chief of the organisation, wrote in the introduction of 
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der of the Governor General of Formosa, is to set forth the general aspect of old laws 
and customs of Formosa, in the hope that something may thereby be done to improve 
the administration of the island”.58 Soon after the promulgation of the ordinance, the 
scientist Kobayashi Rihei, who was working for the commission, published a detailed 
investigation of flogging practices in China in a journal entitled “Reports on Old Cus-
toms of Taiwan”.59 He finally submitted a proposal to Gotō Shinpei with “instruments 
for flogging”.60 These “instruments” were described by Kobayashi in an article, published 
shortly after the handing in of the proposal, as an adaption of the methods of the Qing 
for the situation in Taiwan, nowadays.61 Such investigations and resulting instructions 
of practice arose from the immediate need to have directions for the execution of flog-
ging or to have precise rules before the enactment of the ordinance at the beginning of 
May.62
One of the two instruments the scientists presented to the General Governor was a sort 
of whip, which they had, to use the words of the scientists, “modernised” and “scientifi-
cated” from three models of the Qing dynasty.63 In doing so, they defined contemporary 
Chinese forms of punishment as backward – here you can again observe the phenomenon 
of displacing ‘the other’ into the past.64 The second instrument was a cruciform wooden 
construction upon which the victim was strapped during the execution of flogging. It 
is accurately sketched how the body is to be placed on the wood, and in the sketch, the 
long hair of the victim is prominent, a signifier for ‘barbarism per se’. Exactly for that 
reason Meiji politicians had already prohibited long hair for men in 1872 in Japan, as 
mentioned above.65 It was also prohibited in Taiwan shortly after the annexation.66 Re-
markably, the construction of this “punishment plate”67 had already been implemented 
following Chinese models for the shinritsu kōryō in 1871 in Japan itself after intense 
investigations by a team of scientists who were appointed for that purpose.68
The implementation of flogging did not only precede a knowledge transfer, in a trans-
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the ‘East’, as is often conventionally described in historiography. The Japanese Colonial 
Government did not simply take over the flogging model from the British colonies in 
Egypt or India, nor did they modify British knowledge on flogging. Rather, the General 
Government undertook the strategy of the British of legitimizing certain punishment 
modes through the adaption and ‘civilisation’ of “native punishment practices”. But in 
the practical implementation, the executors in Taiwan obviously often went back to the 
practice of “beat on the back”, 69 which was mostly in use in Japan around the Meiji Rev-
olution (1868), even though the ordinance had explicitly specified it to be carried out 
differently. The adaption of ‘Chinese’ knowledge into ‘Japanese’ concerning the “punish-
ment plate” leads back to the compilation of the shinritsu kōryō in 1871 in Japan itself. 
Some years later it again came back to Taiwan in a modified version. From their studies 
of whips in the Qing Empire, models most likely used on the Chinese mainland and not 
in Taiwan, Japanese scientists created a new “scientific” whip. In doing this, however, 
they consulted “Western science”, which for them was the epitome of ‘civilisation’, and 
thus on the subject of flogging, a merging of different layers of knowledge took place.
If we take a closer look into how the “punishment instruments” were implemented, it 
becomes even clearer that practices were probably similarly executed in Japan before 
the abolition of flogging. Therefore, they can be seen as an insurmountable antagonism 
between the discourse of self civilising within Japan, on one hand, and on the other, 
the discourse of the civilising mission towards the Taiwanese. The General Government 
looked for suitable training personnel who could teach the correct practice of flogging 
to the supervisors of prisons and to police officers. They found Japanese experts who 
provided instruction in several prisons and police stations for groups of around 250 
persons.70
An old man from the time of the Tokugawa government received an appointment in the 
prison in Taipei and was assigned with the production and construction of the “instru-
ments”. Likewise his duties included the instruction of the personnel in the execution 
of flogging.71 But two thirds of the flogging did not even take place in the prisons, 
but rather was executed through the police forces adapted by the Colonial Government 
from police structures dating back to the former Qing Regime.72 Many offences which 
fell under the “Fines and Flogging Ordinance” were immediately regulated by the po-
lice instead of the justice department.73 So-called auxiliary policemen, mainly recruited 
from the male, indigenous population with the attribute ‘Chinese’, received this ‘scope 
of action’ in attending instruction by Japanese specialists on an adequate execution of 
flogging.74 This ‘scope of action’ was not really a contradiction to the rule of difference 
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the power structure. As Trutz von Trotha pointed out in his study on flogging practices 
in the German colonies,75 it was probably the fear of “degeneration” as a consequence of 
personally executing the flogging as the coloniser rather than a delegation of power. In 
the newspaper published by the General Government, a description of the first executed 
flogging in Taiwan complains that the auxiliary policemen had not beat hard enough 
and the punished had not even felt pain. The article also points out that the beating is 
executed under the surveillance of the Japanese supervisor.76 To avoid such problems 
of power relations and an infiltration of hegemony, a Japanese scientist even suggested 
constructing machines which would take over the execution of flogging and make it even 
more ‘modern’.77
In order to maintain power, anguish was a key issue for the Colonial Government. They 
ordered a special investigation to analyse the fear of the victims of corporal punish-
ment. Their findings especially stress the anxiety of the victims in the moment of being 
strapped on the “punishment plate”.78 But the feeling of fear did not only occur on the 
side of the punished; the Colonial Government also felt menaced, a striking antagonism 
to the claim of civilising.79 Several colonial officers or scientists wrote about the same an-
ecdote in which Taiwanese were ridiculing the punishment measures of the Government. 
In the anecdote Taiwanese people prefer to go to prisons rather than live a reputable life, 
because the prison is like a “palace” and once inside, they do not have to work hard and 
can now eat better food than ever before.80 The acting of the “islander” in this anecdote 
is explained by the evil character of the “Chinese race” and the necessity of not only 
punishing their bodies, but also their souls in order to civilise them. For this purpose 
the practice of flogging was estimated to be the best.81 Within his discourse on flogging, 
Suzuki, for example, used a criminological vocabulary in alluding to Cesare Lombroso,82 
the founder of criminology in Europe.83
Besides the emotional implications of flogging, the physical ones certainly remained 
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amine the victims and decide the number of strokes.84 Though in theory it claimed not 
to be dangerous to health, it turned out to be different in practice: often the death of the 
punished occurred during or after the execution of the sentences.85
This gap between practice and theory also existed in Japan, at least until 1882. Even 
though flogging had been prohibited by Ohara in 1871, and torture abolished in 1879, 
there were still several cases of flogging. In reality, it was not abolished until 1882, be-
cause the shinritsu kōryō was still widely in use until then. For example, in 1880 an inci-
dence of a flogging of a Japanese criminal who escaped from a prison was reported in an 
article without any discussion of the proceeding as ‘barbarous’ punishment.86
3.   Taihoku’s New Prison: Representation of Modernity and Symbol  
of the Double Bind Civilising Mission
Another crucial aspect of the modernisation of criminal law in Japan as well as in Taiwan 
were the prison reforms. I will first take another look at the metropole and will go into 
some detail about the jail modernisations in Japan. Although the reforms of the “sur-
veillance jails” had been made by Ohara in the early 1870s, his prison, finally built in 
1872, because of financial restraints, could only be constructed out of wood and not in 
stone as suggested in his “Prison Rules”.87 Daily newspaper articles from the early 1880s 
show that in general the surveillance principles did not work well. The daily newspaper 
Yomiuri shinbun regularly reported that prisoners had escaped from the new jails. In ad-
dition to the issue of the precarious security of the prisons, the issue of hygiene in the jails 
was widely and controversially discussed. One article from October 1877 proudly states 
that there was not a single case of cholera in the Tsukujima prison.88 But five years later 
there were several articles complaining about the widespread transmission of cholera 
within prisons, in the Tsukujima jail among others.89 Contemporaries in the 1880s also 
complained that the current penal codes were based exclusively on the spirit of Chinese 
penal codes, and that therefore, the treatment of the criminal was only superficial and 
did not touch his mind.90 Finally in 1894, the Japanese Government decided to build 
a new “modern” “international prison”, the Sugamo prison. An American trained ar-
chitect, Tsumaki Yorinaka, designed the prison which took four years to build. After its 
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the Bank of Japan and the National Armory. The perimeter of the prison was over 1.6 
kilometres long and bound by a massive five meter high brick wall.91
The General Government built three modern surveillance jails (kangoku) in Taiwan soon 
after the takeover in order to meet the immediate need for prisons to incarcerate the 
so-called “bandits”, leaders of uprisings, and criminals. One of these surveillance jails, 
the one in Taihoku (Taipei), was the above-mentioned palace, and was often described 
as such by contemporaries. The politician and writer Takekoshi Yosaburō described the 
prison in the English language edition of the 1905 survey on Japanese rule in Formosa 
with the following words: 
Many people, even in Tokyo, must be surprised that the Sugamo Prison or the other 
prisons in Tokyo are such fine, lofty, brick buildings. But in Taihoku the prison is built 
of stone, which is superior even to brick.92 
The point of comparison in the passage was of course the Sugamo prison in Tokyo, as 
one of the three largest new buildings and one of the symbols of Japan’s modernity. But 
as Takekoshi highlights in his statement, the prison in Taipei was made from stone, 
an even more modern material than the Sugamo prison, which was ‘only’ made from 
brick. Tejima proudly presented photographs of the Taihoku prison in a lecture to other 
penologists on his visit to Tokyo in 1905. His fascination with stone as a material was 
also demonstrated when he told the audience that even the canalisation was made from 
stone. He concluded enthusiastically: “I am not overdrawing, if I tell you that the archi-
tecture is so felicitous, that it is the most beautiful building in all of Taipei now”.93 Stone 
buildings were an important representation of modernity in Japan, where before the Meiji-
Revolution almost everything had been built in wood. The prison’s stone structure and its 
eternal character both served as a representation of Japan’s modernity already established 
in Taiwan after some years of colonial rule. The objective was not only to civilise ‘barba-
rous’ Taiwanese within these stone walls, but also to spread outwards as a symbol of the 
high level of civilisation in the colonies, and therefore, as Tejima’s speech illustrates, also 
on the mainland to the Japanese population. These inner and outer efforts to civilise were 
coeval and intertwined with the encounters of other imperial powers, as is demonstrated 
in the English statement written by Takekoshi clearly meant for a ‘Western’ audience. 
This simultaneous dispersion of certain notions of civilisation and modernity to the cen-
tre as well as the periphery, and also to the ‘West’, perfectly illustrates the double bind 
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of the ‘West’ as the epitome of civilisation, Chinese legal codes, in this context, were 
degraded as only superficial and not affecting the criminal’s mind.94
4. Conclusion
After the coerced opening of the country, the Japanese struggled against colonisation 
under the constant pressure to become ‘civilised’ and ‘modern’. This situation led to 
the phenomenon of ‘self civilisation’. As one part of this ‘self civilisation’, ‘Western’ cat-
egories such as ‘race’ were adapted. To what extent the dichotomies of ‘civilised’ and 
‘barbarous’ in conjunction with the framework of ‘race’ were internalised is shown by 
Ohara Shigeya in his excursion to the English colonial prisons and in his observation of 
a “colonial unconsciousness” underlying Japanese modernity.
But the inner mission for civilisation was also entangled with Japan’s external mission 
towards their neighbours. This was already apparent in their effort to colonise Taiwan 
in 1874, an effort which also sheds light on the ambiguities within the civilising efforts. 
Domestically, the reform of legal codes and also the practical execution of punishments 
were based on Chinese practices, while simultaneously there was an effort to civilise ‘the 
other’ in Taiwan – a former part of China. This phenomenon alludes to shifting notions 
of civilisation within Japanese politics and their dilemma in establishing either the ‘East’ 
or the ‘West’ as the embodiment of civilisation, and therefore characterizes the double 
bind situation resulting in Japan’s civilising missions.
The dispute on flogging measures in Taiwan illustrates that there was no escape from the 
concept of modernity itself. I argued that the recognition of the peril of being overcome 
by discourse on modernity and the impossible imperative of overcoming it, as Harootunian 
has described it for the decades after 1912, can already be seen in the controversy on 
flogging regulations in Taiwan. And it was this dilemma which led to the ruptures and 
ambiguities of civilising missions, both on the level of discourse as well as on the level of 
practice within the implementation of flogging in Taiwan.
The new Taihoku prison as a symbol of modernity demonstrates another dimension 
of the entangled aspect of the civilising missions. It exemplifies how certain notions of 
civilisation and modernity had been coevally dispersed to the metropole and the colony, 
and how this phenomenon was intertwined with the similarly ongoing self-assertion dis-
course towards ‘Western’ powers. Therefore it functions as a signifier of the double bind 
structure in which the civilising missions were imbedded.
Using an analytical framework of the concept double bind combined with the idea of a 
quadripartite constellation enabled me to bring to light the intertwined character of the 
two civilising missions and to shed light on specific tensions, as well as mechanisms of 
knowledge transfer, on which the penal reforms in the Japanese Empire were based.
94	 N.	Umemori,	Spatial	Configuration	(footnote	90),	p.	747.
